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This article relates to the question of whether or to what extent identity 
is wholly constructed through language by engaging in a discussion 
of how the use of the past enters into the construction of communal 
identity. It argues that in order to understand why collective memory 
and the mythical narrativisation of the past which it frames are such 
powerful elements in the construction of collective identities, it must 
be distinguished from the science of historiography. But neither 
can collective memory be thought of as a communal analogue to 
the individual mental process of remembering. Rather it is a specific 
kind of discourse whose subject-position is endowed with a number 
of distinct privileges (different from those in the discourse of modern 
historiography) and through which a community can approach and 
articulate its past in mythical narratives whose ‘validity’ in fact has little 
to do with the extent to which they mirror ‘historical reality’.
The discussion about whether or to what extent human identity – 
both at an individual and at a collective level – is wholly constructed 
through language, entails a vast array of controversies and fault lines. 
A dominant one has been the discussion about the ‘plasticity’ of reality 
in relation to the force of symbolic inscription; the degree to which the 
world – and ourselves in it – simply yields to our language about it, and 
thus to the interests, biases and power hierarchies ingrained in language 
and language use at any given time. In the field of history this debate 
has centred on the issue of ‘collective memory’ and its associated term 
‘mythical narratives’. In the classical teleological idea of history, the 
past could be mined for the truth about the present. The initial scandal 
of such notions as ‘collective memory’ was that it inverted this causal 
relationship, claiming that it was to a large extent the power relationships 
and needs of the present, which determines how the past was imagined 
– and that the historical sciences where indeed part of this dynamic. 
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 In what follows I will align myself with the constructivist view 
that the present identity of a community is certainly not simply produced 
by its history, but is a construction which involves – in a central way – 
the correlate construction of adequate narratives about the communal 
past. But I will also argue that it is nevertheless too simplistic to 
claim that the historiography and the narratives of collective memory 
are therefore two sides of the same thing. Historiography is not simply 
an institutionalised version of collective memory, nor is collective 
memory simply ‘bad history’. In order to understand why collective 
memory and the mythical narrativisation of the past which it frames, 
are such powerful elements in the construction of collective identities, 
it must be distinguished from the science of historiography. Even if often 
intermingled, the (ideal-typical) differences nevertheless discernable 
between collective memory and historical science, allows for a clearer 
view of the specific practices, privileges, and functions that myth and 
memory has in relation to the symbolic construction and maintenance 
of community.
 I will furthermore argue that collective memory should not be 
thought of as a communal analogue to the individual mental process of 
remembering, but rather as a specific kind of discourse, whose subject-
position is endowed with a number of distinct privileges (different from 
those in the discourse of modern historiography) and through which, a 
community can approach and articulate its past in mythical narratives 
whose ‘validity’ in fact has little to do with the extent to which they 
mirror ‘historical reality’. Myth – understood here as the narration of the 
communal past, present and future utilising the privileges of a collective 
memory discourse – is not to be understood simply as a ‘primitive’, 
‘degraded’ or ‘amateurish’ form of historical recounting, but as form 
of political narrativity which deliver legitimacy to both present power 
structures in a community and to future political aims.
First, however it is necessary to discuss the connection between identity 
and the narration of the past in more general terms. Here I rely primarily 
on the thinking of Paul Ricoeur.
Narrating the past and identity
In Ricoeur’s thinking temporality and narrative are connected at a 
fundamental level of the human experience. The foundational claim in 
Ricoeur’s theory is that narrative is not a representational form that 
can be imposed on reality; it is an ontological condition of social life. 
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It is the way human subjects comprehend temporality. As Ricoeur puts 
it: “Time becomes human to the extent that it is articulated through 
a narrative mode” (Ricoeur 1984:52). Events are therefore ascribed a 
specific meaning through emplotment. The act of emplotment consists 
in the integration of the episodic dimension of narrative (the dispersal 
of different events in a chronology), with the configural dimension 
(the story as a whole, with unified point or theme to it). “In short, 
emplotment is the operation that draws a configuration out of a simple 
succession” (Ricoeur 1984:65). And conversely an event “only get its 
definition from its contribution to the development of the plot”. (Ricoeur 
1984:65). What we have is a past (the events) that only becomes ‘our 
(hi)story’ (a narrative) through the intervention of emplotment, or as 
Ricoeur would have it “(…) a prefigured time that becomes a refigured 
time through the mediation of a configured time.” (Ricoeur 1984:54). 
 The fundamental point here is that when temporality is given the 
form of narrative, this is a way of handling contingency. The passing of 
time itself does not deliver any kind of stability or final meaning, simply 
because it is a process which never stops or concludes. As Barbie Zelizer 
puts it: “Time undoes its ability to shape communities by not being able 
to stop shaping them” (Zelizer 1995:222).  Emplotment is the operation 
which “(...) inverts the effect of contingency, in the sense of that which 
could have happened differently or which might not have happened at all, 
by incorporating it in some way into the effect of necessity or probability 
exerted by the configuring act”(Ricoeur 1992:142). Narrative in other 
words domesticates the temporal onslaught of unexpected or seemingly 
meaningless events by ascribing them a teleological necessity, not 
simply by constructing obvious causal links, but by treating them as 
twists and turns in an unfolding story, which by its very form carries the 
promise of a meaningful conclusion; a unified point or morale. Events 
might then very well keep their status as unexpected or ‘turning points’ 
but they are so within the narrative structure and as such can still be 
considered meaningful in relation to the plot of the story. Narrating, 
quite simply, is not about denying change, but about domesticating it, 
giving it a direction and a point. Temporal changes, in other words, are 
stripped of their contingency, by transforming them into a (teleological) 
development of a unified plot. 
 Ricoeur’s ideas about identity emerges directly form his theory of 
narrative. The identity of the subject is constituted as that of a character 
in a story. This means that “Narrative constructs the identity of the 
character (…) in constructing that of the story told. It is the identity of 
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the story that makes the identity of the character” (Ricoeur 1992:147-
148).  Ricoeur’s fundamental claim about human identity, our sense of 
selfhood (Ipseity), is that it is constituted as the result of a narrative, 
as the endpoint of an emplotted development. And as such that it is 
more and different form the identity of things (Idem) which is simply 
constituted as the identity of being permanently identical to it-self. 
To be a thing is to be identified and re-identified as the same by a 
range of unchanging properties. To be human is something more; the 
identity of the human subject has a narrative dimension. The subject is 
characterised by having what Heidegger called Dasein, the ability to 
pose the question ‘who am I?’ (Ricoeur 1991:75). To examine ipseity, 
Ricoeur claims, is; 
[T]o look into the nature of the question to which the self forms 
a response (…). This question is the question who, distinct from 
the question what. It is the question we preferentially pose in the 
domain of action when, in searching for the agent, the author of 
the action, we ask, ‘who did this or that?’ 
(Ricoeur 1991:75)
The distinction between the question of identity in terms of ‘who’ and 
in terms of ‘what’ is central here. In fact it is Ricoeur’s main critique 
that these two are often mixed together in discussions of identity. The 
problem in such discussion, he contends, is that the question of ipseity 
‘who?’ is answered in the mode of identity that is proper to the question 
‘what?’. The fulfilling answer the question of ‘who’ (are you?) is he 
claims, drawing on Hannah Arendt, “to tell the story of a life” (Ricoeur 
1988: 246). This translates into three assertions made by Ricoeur: “a) 
knowledge of the self is an interpretation, b) the interpretation of the 
self finds narrative, among other signs and symbols, to be a privileged 
mediation; c) this mediation borrows from history as much as fiction, 
making the life story a fictive history or (…) a historical fiction (…)” 
(Ricoeur 1991:73). 
 Ricoeur’s idea of identity are formulated in relation to the 
individual, but as Ricoeur himself repeatedly claims, the main points 
however does correspond equally well with the identity of communities. 
 Fundamentally it seems viable to claim that also when speaking 
of collective identities, their temporal dimension is in fact a narrative 
one. From the plethora of events and changes that make out the past 
of any community, meaning is drawn or rather formed through the 
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construction of a narrative. The actual past is of course always more 
than the narrative. The configuration of a temporal succession in to a 
narrative involves eliminating the ambiguity of any event emplotted 
- suppressing alternative interpretations than that which conforms to 
the narrative plot. But it also involves a basic selection of at the level 
of events. The narrative configuration of the past will always involve 
simply disregarding some events or developments as irrelevant or 
arbitrary. Relating to the past as a meaningful narrative does in other 
words not only entail remembering certain events in a certain way, but 
also the disregarding or forgetting of a range of others. The elimination of 
contingency through narrative comes then at the price of what we might 
call the full complexity of the past. The suppression of contingency 
in narrative results in the suppression of contingency in its characters. 
The narrative construction of identity - positing the community as the 
result of a meaningful temporal process - serves to imbue the present 
constitution of the community with an air of necessity and naturalness. 
But if narrative is to fulfil the function of eliminating contingency 
in identity, then its own constructed and therefore contingent nature 
must be denied. It must appear exactly not as a specific narrative of 
the past (that is one among others), but as the Past itself: singular, 
indisputable and incontestable. Hayden White also makes this point 
by distinguishing “between a historical discourse that narrates, on the 
one side, and a discourse that narrativizes, on the other; between a 
discourse that openly adopts a perspective that looks out on the world 
and reports it and a discourse that feigns to make the world speak itself 
and speak itself as a story”(White 1980: 6-7). The construction of 
identity relies, in White’s terminology, not only on a narration of the 
past, but on its narrativization. I contend that such narrativisation and 
its connection with a specific community is what becomes available 
when the past is articulated in what might be called the discourse of 
collective memory and that this has to do with the specific privilege 
enjoyed by the speaking subject here, or in a Foucauldian terminology 
with the mandate tied to the subject-position of this discourse. The 
crucial questions thereby shift from a focus on ontological foundations 
to one on the actual discursive practices. One is no longer preoccupied 
with the question of what collective memory is (as some kind of object 
in the world which either exists or not), but instead in how it is done (as 
a discursive praxis which produces its own effects and consequences 
irrespective of its ontological status). 
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The privileges of the first person plural: The past as History and 
Memory 
Treating collective memory as a specific kind of discourse, therefore 
not only reorients the investigation towards the kind of privileges 
enjoyed by the narrating subject, but also allows one to cut across 
one of the central unresolved issues of the very concept of collective 
memory. The very concept itself has almost from the onset come under 
attack as nonsensical by scholars who point out, that memory is a 
mental operation undertaken by individuals in relation to their unique 
experiences and as such cannot be collectivised unless one is ready to 
postulate the existence of some kind of collective mind. At the onset 
however, the idea of a collective or social dimension to memory did not 
so much involve the postulate of shared memory content or indeed of 
a collective process of remembering, but rather simply pointed out the 
social context in which (individual) remembering took place and the 
impact of this context on what was to be remembered.
 In the seminal works on ‘the social frameworks of memory’ by 
Maurice Halbwachs the central claim was that memory is selective, 
and that the selection of what was to be remembered and what was 
to be forgotten, was by no means an autonomous decision taken by 
the individual. It was determined by the social frames within which 
the remembering took place; i.e. by the groups of which the individual 
was a member, be it the family, the nation or the religion (Halbwachs 
1992:38, 55-54, 167-189). The collective level in Halbwachs is more 
than anything simply the supplier of schemata for what should be 
remembered, whereas the content of memories remains individual and 
personal (Warring 1996). In this vein James Young has argued, that 
individuals cannot “share another’s memory any more than they can 
share another’s cortex. They share instead the forms of memory, even 
the meanings in memory generated by these forms, but an individual’s 
memory remains hers alone” (Young 1993: xi). There in this case, 
as Reinhardt Koselleck has likewise recently argued, no such thing 
collective memory. As any memory relies on an individual experience, 
there are only collective conditions for remembering (Koselleck 
2003:58). 
 This attitude wards of any implicit or explicit positing of collective 
mental faculties akin to the long discredited ideas of Völkerpsykologie 
(Wilson 2005). But the consequence is that the subject of memory is 
always in the last instance an individual. The only place left for a concept 
of collective memory, is as a simple multiplication of such remembering 
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individuals. This ties any remaining idea of collective memory to groups 
of people that where all really and personally ‘there’; to those often few 
surviving Zeitzeuge of a certain event (Markovits & Reich 1997:16). 
In this vein it makes sense to talk of the collective memory of the 
Holocaust, only if it is the collective of Holocaust survivors one refers 
to, and certainly not as a collective memory of a nation or a continent. 
Not only is the dissemination of memories in spatial terms excluded, 
i.e. that the nation as a collective can remember what strictly only 
happened to a part of its members, but the dissemination of memories 
between generations is equally ruled out. This means that collective 
memory falls away (or turns into history if one follows Halbwachs 
(Crane 1997:1377)) with the passing of each succeeding generation. 
 In the end then we may have warded of the inconsistency of 
implicitly postulating a collective mind as the foundation of collective 
memory, but the price seems to be that the concept is emptied of most 
of its analytical potential in relation to a world in which nations are 
routinely referred to as having forgotten, and where the exclamation 
‘Remember!’ or ‘We must never forget’ – for example in referring to 
the Holocaust - is often directed at audiences, most members of which 
are simply too young for this possible in any strictly real or individual 
sense.
 As Paul Connerton has rightly pointed out, if collective memory 
is to be a useful concept it must be liberated for the tight connection 
to Zeitzeuge. It must include an idea of how memories can be passed 
on between generations, in such a way that members of collectives 
have a range of memories that strictly speaking are not their own 
(Connerton 1989:36-40). The solution that Connerton and many others 
have sought is to think of memory as having a materiality that exists 
independently of the individual and his lifespan. The focus then turns 
to commemorative rituals, monuments and traditions. Most famously 
in this vain is Pierre Nora’s extensive survey of places where collective 
memory is anchored, the so called ‘liex de memoire’ (Nora 1989). As 
Kerwin Lee Klein critically remarks however, this approach might 
escape any talk of a collective mind, but instead “we enter a new age 
in which archives remember and statues forget” (Klein 2000:136). The 
discussion on where to locate the remembering capacity is in other words 
by no means dodged or solved by shifting the focus to the materiality 
or ‘texture of memory’ as a central work in this vein is entitled (Young 
1993). It would seem that we are trapped in a choice between using the 
concept in a severely limited or in a thoroughly inconsistent way.
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 The fact is however, that this dilemma only arises because 
collective memory is thought of in term analogous to the individual 
mental process of recalling earlier experiences in the mind. Actually this 
is a very limited and ‘technical’ view of memory even at the individual 
level. It focuses solely on memory as an ‘information-retrieval’ process 
requiring a certain kind of ‘hardware’ (the individual human brain). But 
as already Kierkegaard understood, what is crucial about memory – in 
the sense that it is employed in speaking about ‘collective memory’ – 
is less the facts retrieved or the means of their retrieval, and more the 
distinct kind of relationship which the remembering subject maintains 
to that which is remembered. Kierkegaard distinguishes between 
recollecting (the Danish original of which is erindre) and remembering, 
(which in Danish is huske). A central claim is that:
To recollect [erindre] is by no means the same as to remember 
[huske]. For example one can remember very well every single 
detail of an event without thereby recollecting it. Remembering 
is only a vanishing condition. Through memory the experience 
presents itself to receive the consecration of recollection.
(Kierkegaard 1988:9)
The distinction between recollection and remembering is less sharp 
in English, but in Danish the terms ‘huske’ and ‘erindre’ in fact still 
retain the distinct connotations that Kierkegaard emphasises. ‘Huske’/
remembering is simply information retrieval and regard recalling the 
past event in as much detail as possible. But as Kierkegaard states 
‘erindring’/recollection is something much more than remembering the 
details. It is a consecration, a deep emotional connection established 
to something past. It involves the subject’s deepest reflection about his 
past in relation to his present existence (Kierkegaard 1988:10). When 
recollecting what matters is the meaning that the past events holds for 
the remembering subject, and thus their ability to signify moral lessons, 
crucial personal developments or choices with profound consequences. 
Recollection is about the ‘subjective past’. It is not about the correctness 
of the historical details, its function is not to render precisely how 
things really were, but to speak of what they meant and mean to the 
remembering subject. Recollection as a relation to the past in other 
words marks out the subject of the recollecting activity, and privileges 
it above the objects remembered. The privilege of recollection then is 
akin to those of the literary genre of autobiography, in which, as Torben 
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Weinreich has pointed out, the subject’s account of the past becomes 
immune to factual critique:
Others may claim from the outside; I too saw it happen and you 
are mistaken. But such protests have no legitimacy, because no 
one else has ‘internal access…. to knowledge about the I that 
the narrative is about’(…).  The I-narrator then has not only a 
subjectivity privilege but also a sovereignty privilege, not only 
access to but the exclusive right to the I. 
(my translation, Weinreich 1996:102)
 
It is in essence my suggestion that collective memory should be treated 
as a form of discourse akin to autobiography, and that crucially the very 
term collective memory is in fact something of a misnomer. The kind of 
relationship to the past that is articulated in collective memory is actually 
that which Kierkegaard termed recollection/erindring. What we mean 
when speaking of collective memory is in fact the articulation of past 
events in the mode of recollecting them, and in a way which posits the 
community as the subject thus contemplating its meaning through the 
recalling of its past. Whether or not particular members of the community 
actually experienced the collectively remembered events matters less. 
Just as the community only exists in an imagined form, so too does its 
collective past. Imagined communities are, as Benedict Anderson has 
argued, composed not simply at the congregation of current members, 
but as an purely discursive construction of communion including not 
just present members who will never actually meet and interact, but 
also members long dead and those yet to be born (Anderson 1991). 
In collective memory we speak in the name of and in the voice of this 
extended imagined community. The privilege and mandate enjoyed 
by the subject-position from which one speaks in a collective memory 
discourse, therefore potentially transcends that of simply representing 
the community (being authorised to speak on its behalf – in its name), 
and involves the ‘autobiographical’ privilege of speaking its voice, of 
exclusive internal access to the unique experience of the remembering 
‘We’. It is so to speak a transfer to a collective level of the privilege 
afforded the subject who has not only witnessed something, but who is 
recounting the autobiographical story of what it meant to the subject. 
Here no exterior voice or critique has any force, nor is it necessary that 
the narrative validates itself in relation to some empirical or otherwise 
established ‘objective’ foundation of how it ‘really’ was. Collective 
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memory is a species of Kierkegaard’s ‘recollection/erindring’ because it 
is about the emotional impact of a past event rather than about its factual 
reality and as such it unashamedly privileges the ‘internal’ subjective 
relation to this experienced past. But the prime achievement of collective 
memory discourses is that despite moving from a witnessing ‘I’ 
situated in time and space, to a both spatially and temporally extensive 
‘we’, these autobiographical privileges is nevertheless retained. If as 
Kierkegaard argues the individual can remember without recollecting 
(recalling information without any particular emotional impact), the 
members of a community can – when articulating their common past 
as collective memory – recollect without remembering. The emotional 
and existential significance of certain past events for the community 
can be discursively marked and thus transferred to generations which 
did not experience them. The past events collectively recollected cease 
to be simply more or less factual accounts of past events, and become 
in their own right the resource of moral metaphors and sacred values 
around which community membership is constituted and bordered. In 
the last instance a certain relationship to or interpretation of past event 
might therefore emerge as a continual moral imperative; To be German 
is to accept the moral meaning and burden of a particular collective 
Holocaust memory, also for those generations lucky enough to be born 
after the Second World War. This of course does not mean that collective 
memories do not change or cannot be refuted by those who might 
disagree with the communal imperatives that they underpin. However 
their change or critique are rarely simply a consequence of new historical 
knowledge coming to light. The struggles over collective memory 
are often masked political struggles about the moral infrastructure of 
present societies, rather than about the factual reality of past ones. In 
this light for example the gradual breaking up of a certain simplified 
heroic memory of Danish resistance during the German occupation, 
has less to do with discoveries made in archives, but should rather be 
understood in terms of a radically changed contemporary context in 
which stereotypical enmities and essentialised images of the (German) 
Other have become both morally and politically unviable. Indeed 
such a point seems further supported by the fact the traditional heroic 
narrative of Danish resistance is maintained most forcefully by political 
forces on the right for whom it is opportune to establish a parallel to a 
contemporary stereotypical and essentialised (Muslim) Other. 
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 To grasp the specific nature, privileges and effects of a collective 
memory discourse, it is as such crucial to insist that such a discourse is 
not identical to that of historiography, and not even ‘bad historiography’. Of 
course what is here described under the headings of collective memory 
and historiography, is to a large extent ideal types; heuristically constructed 
outer points on a continuum. Any historical account, statement or 
work will most often contain components of both. Nonetheless their 
differentiation remains important and instructive. As argued above 
a place to start such differentiation would be in pointing out how 
collective memory privileges the subjective and emotional, disallowing 
outside voices and producing ultimately moral imperatives, whereas 
historiography upholds the (always unrealised) ideal of a disinterested 
objectivity, open to legitimate critique and revision.  As Kerwin Lee 
Klein puts it: “If history is objective in the coldest hardest sense of the 
word, memory is subjective in the warmest. In contrast with history, 
memory fairly vibrates with the fullness of being.”(Klein 2000:130). 
Historiography therefore ideally maintains a distance to its subject 
matter. ‘History’ as Ricoeur has pointed out actually has two distinctly 
different meanings; it is on the one hand a literary activity – the writing 
of historiography, but on the other it is also ‘what men do and suffer’ 
the actual temporal mode of human existence (Ricoeur 1988:274). 
Whereas historiography marks this difference – it is a literary account 
of someone else’s history, their lived experience – collective memory 
hides it, reporting the experiences of past individuals as ‘ours’. 
Historiography is the critical appraisal of the memory of others - in the 
form of the traces or sources left by the past – through the application 
of the methodology of the historical science. The historian relates to 
past events and experiences from a distance – he is external to them 
and it is this disinterested externality which is believed to guarantee 
scientific objectivity. But it also means that the historian does not 
have the privileges of subjectivity or sovereignty. Indeed the entire 
methodology of historiography serves to codify a universal framework 
for critiquing the historical interpretation of the past. The point is that in 
historiography any interpretation of truth may be legitimately challenged 
if this critique adheres to the rules of historiographical methodology. 
No such legitimate position of contention exists in memory. Where in 
historiography the historian interrogates memories that are not his own, 
i.e. relate to witnesses, and are subject to a codified form of legitimate 
critique by his peers, in memory all these roles or positions collapse in to 
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one. The collective is at once the witness, the interpreter and the validator 
of its past. Whereas historiography in marking out the difference between 
the lived experience examined, and the literary work of historiography 
as an interpretation of this object, unavoidably also marks the existence 
and legitimacy of alternative interpretations, collective memory makes 
no such concessions. This of course does not mean that there cannot 
or does not exist different memories about the same events, but rather 
that there is no framework for their comparison; each is sovereign in 
its own right.  In terms of Haydn White’s distinction between narrating 
the past and narrativising it, the lack of interpretative distance drives 
the discourse of collective memory towards a narrativising of the past. 
When the interpretative distance – and thereby the existence of valid 
alternative interpretations – is denied, the resulting narrative no longer 
express a certain agency acting behind it construction, but seemingly 
flow naturally from the past itself.
 But furthermore collective memory actually does not treat the 
past as past at all. It does not enquire into the fascinating strangeness 
of earlier times, rather its point is to assert a fundamental similarity 
between past events and present conditions, because the past events 
in memory serves only to illustrate moral principles that are beyond 
the particular context of their historical illustration. The function of 
memory in other words is to speak of the moral universals of good and 
evil, rather than interrogate the differences between past and present 
realities. It relates therefore to past events through a fundamental lack 
of historicity:
Collective memory is in a crucial sense ahistorical. (...) Historical 
consciousness, by its nature, focuses on the historicity of events 
– that they took place then and not now, that they grew out of 
circumstances different from those that now obtain. Memory, 
by contrast, has no sense of the passage of time; it denies the 
‘pastness’ of its objects and insists on their continuing presence.
(Novick 1999:4)
 
This does of course not mean that memory does not situate that which 
is remembered in the chronological past, but that the events of memory 
is not conceived of as ‘belonging’ to another time. Their emotional 
impact on the remembering subject resurrects them and make them 
continually relevant for moral orientation even in a time far removed 
and fundamentally different from that of their occurrence. 
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 Collective memory is as such a type of discourse which entail 
substantial privileges for consuming and instrumentalising the past, and 
which is therefore in fact most often not concerned with the past as 
past. It consists rather of articulations whose real object and function is 
to speak of the present of community, to reiterate certain fundamental 
values and ideals in the guise of recollecting its past experiences, and 
ultimately to employ these privileges of communal recollection to 
legitimate present and future political choices.  The concept of political 
myth would then designate the kind of narrative which operates within 
the privileges of collective memory, and whose emplotment of a 
communal past, present and future realises their political potential in 
specific forms. 
Political Myth: Narrating past, present and future
Myths, as I will conceptualise them here1, are historical narratives, but 
their strength does not – as is the case in historical science – rest only 
on a claim that they truthfully recount ‘what really happened’. Situated 
within the discursive framework of collective memory, mythical 
truth is moral, rather than empirical truth. More than anything, myth 
claims what Bruce Lincoln calls authority, which is a kind of validity 
engendered by the fact that they tell the paradigmatic truth (Lincoln 
1989:24). Their narrative produces – as Clifford Geertz remarked about 
religion (Geertz 1973:93) – simultaneously a ‘model of’ and a ‘model 
for’ the world. Myth narrates the beginning of a world – the moment 
of foundation. But the mythical narrative flows from the origins to the 
present and beyond. The ideological function of myth is to promise us 
‘a conclusion’ to the community’s narrative identity in the form of a 
future utopian horizon.  
 Political myths are cosmogonic narratives – they recount the 
origin of the communitarian order and co-existence: the founding 
events (Ricoeur 1987:273). In archaic myths this regarded the creation 
of the world out of some prior primordial chaos or darkness, often 
through the activities of Gods. Political myths share this basic narrative 
structure but regard only the creation of a certain political community, 
nevertheless often still through some radical break with a ‘dark’ pre-
community history. The story of origins therefore renders what is 
considered to be the community’s fundamental and eternal grounding 
principles or characteristics. It separates the sacred and the profane, its 
narrative tells which values and principles are to be forever honoured, 
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and what is to be shunned and avoided at all costs. The first moment 
of the mythical narrative is therefore the community’s emergence from 
a pre-communitarian chaos (Bottici 2007:121-122). The community 
is brought into existence, often by the heroic intervention of select 
‘founding fathers, whose political ideas are subsequently elevated 
to ideal typical visions of the essence of communal moral order. The 
foundation is not a ‘historical’ but a recollected event, which thus 
in a moral sense sets the stage for political legitimacy and hierarchy 
also in the present. Crucially the foundation is always ‘incomplete’. 
The reality of the subsequent community is never a mirror image of 
the Fathers vision, but is found yet to be lacking. It is in this sense 
that myth produces a paradigmatic image of community, an image of 
how it ‘should be’ – but is not yet. It is this element of incompletion – 
of conclusion only yet to come – which drives the narrative forward 
from the origins to the present and beyond. Myth tells the story of how 
community came to be, but is also a story of how it is yet to become. 
The foundation is not narrated as a full constitution but as the beginning 
of a political project.
 In this understanding of political myth there is no longer any 
strict division between ‘foundation myths’ that concentrate on origins, 
and ‘eschatological myths’ that propose a future utopia, as for example 
Henry Tudor suggests. Tudor believes that the former validate the 
given order by grounding it in history, whereas the latter challenges 
the contemporary order by contrasting it to a utopian alternative (Tudor 
1978:305). Political myths as they are understood here always involve 
both a cosmogonic and an eschatological dimension, because they do 
not just paint a contrast to a pre-communitarian chaos, but also point 
towards a utopia in the future. The duality here is not either between 
past and present (foundational myths) or between present and future 
(eschatological myths), but between past (chaos) and future (utopia). 
The difference between the past and the future can be understood as the 
fundamental dichotomy in myth and expresses as such what Mirceau 
Eliade saw as the central mythical differentiation between the sacred 
and the profane (Eliade 1954). Myth therefore is in fact a narrative 
recounting three ‘times’; there is the past time of chaos – a profane time 
before history in the form of the everyday life and political pursuits of 
the community began. There is the future time of utopia – a sacred time 
of such full and effortless harmony that history here will have come 
to an end. But crucially there is suspended in between these two the 
mundane time of contemporary society. It is this mundane in-between 
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which is the operative realm of myth. The function of myth is precisely 
to deliver a grander narrative framing of mundane pursuits – to stage 
everyday political choices as the site of an epic standoff between 
chaos and utopia. Myth therefore does not exist apart from or behind 
the immediate sphere of political activity; it is present here through 
what Hans Blumenberg called ‘the work on myth’ (Blumenberg 1985) 
Through a constant reiteration of its basic plotlines, configurative themes 
and character cast, the present is linked to the founding events and to 
the utopian resolution (Bottici and Challand, 2006:316). By imposing 
the ‘scenography’ of myth on mundane political problems or priorities 
these become more than what is entailed in their practical or immediate 
benefits: they are filled with the moral odour of conclusions and emerge 
as either decisive steps on the road to utopia, or dangerous signs of the 
community ‘slipping backwards’ towards chaos. This of course does not 
mean that the work on myth entails recounting the narrative in totality in 
every political discussion. Speakers instead make use of certain ‘clues’; 
key words, configurative patterns of events or themes that signal to the 
community members that the myth is present. Jörn Rüsen calls this the 
rhetorical deployment of ‘narrative abbreviaturen’ (Rüsen 1994:11). 
Reflecting on Rüsen’s concept, Klaus Grosse-Kracht however suggests 
that the art-historical concept of Pathosformlen might better capture 
the dynamic through which such rhetorical deployment not only refers 
to a narrative, but in doing so infuses an otherwise mundane matter 
with moral weight and pathos (Grosse-Kracht 1996:28). And as Chiara 
Bottici convincingly argues, the infusion of pathos has to do with a 
feeling that things have significance, rather than simply meaning. The 
primary function of myth is not simply to make the world intelligible, but 
to infuse certain choices or objects with significance (Bottici 2007:122-
127). By significance Bottici means that when something becomes part 
of the grand trajectory between chaos and utopia, it ceases to be just 
another object which we ‘know what is’, and becomes invested with 
emotional value, it becomes a site of moral meaning. 
 As already indicated by Ricoeur the narrative form is in fact well 
suited for such an endeavour. Narrative not only unites a temporal 
succession by a common plot but drives this plot towards a unified 
conclusion; a totalising meaning of the entire sequence of temporal 
progression. As Hayden White has argued this has a number of 
interesting implications when the narration presumes to be recounting 
real events.  According to White the problem with narrating history is 
that history as the eternal succession of events in the world does not 
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end, but narrative as a form must end – it must at some point conclude 
(White 1980:26). Whereas earlier forms of historical writing, such as 
chronicles or annals, either have no central subject which unifies the 
events listed or have no conclusion but simply terminate, the writing 
of history as a narrative must have both a central subject (to whom 
history happens) and a conclusion (where history seemingly stops 
happening) (White 1980:24). White’s central insight is that to conclude 
a historical narrative one must exit the mode of recounting different 
events and make a moral judgement which derives a lesson from the 
totality of events: “The demand for closure in the historical story is 
a demand, I suggest, for moral meaning, a demand that sequences of 
real events be assessed as to their significance as elements of a moral 
drama” (White 1980:24). Since history itself does not stop, this moral 
meaning is a consequence of the narrative form rather than of the events 
recounted. And thus the attraction of the narrative form is derived from 
a desire for such conclusive meanings in a world which does not itself 
offer them: “[the] value attached to narrativity in the representation 
of real events arises out of a desire to have real events display the 
coherence, integrity, fullness, and closure of an image of life that is 
and can only be imaginary” (White 1980:27). Mythical narratives trade 
politically on this desire for narrative conclusion and for the total moral 
meaning that it promises. It does in other words not only constitute the 
community’s identity as a narrative identity, as the identity engendered 
by being the central subject in its story, but postpones the conclusion 
of this communal narration into a utopian future, investing this future 
therefore with the desire for a complete and harmonious identity, for a 
world vibrating joyously with a totality of meaning and order.
 The extraordinarily forceful combination of memory and myth in 
the construction and maintenance of community, can then be understood 
to be the combination of a privilege to speak undisturbed about the 
moral meaning of the past (tied to the subject-position of a discourse 
of collective memory), and the progressive narrativity of a mythical 
trajectory entailing the construction of a utopian closure or conclusion 
of total clarity, stability and meaning. One regards the status and the 
mandate of the narrator, the other the narrative’s emplotment and 
trajectory. If collective memory is therefore what secures the conditions 
of possibility for such a subjective, yet collective, appropriation of the 
past, then myth is the narrative form which gives it direction and ties it 
to actual present and future political choices through what Blumenberg 
calls ‘the work on Myth’. 
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Concluding remarks
I have argued here that myth and memory are central in understanding 
the construction of community, but that the force of such collective 
appropriations of the past should not be accounted for by constructing a 
strict analogy to the mental processes of individual memory as psychical 
information retrieval. Collective memory is a discursive structure and 
is transferred as such from individual to individual and from generation 
to generation. The rules which govern its emergence, modification and 
disappearance are those of discourses, not those of the human brain’s 
abilities to store and retrieve information. 
 But to claim that collective memory is a social construction of 
language is by no means to deny its power. On the opposite it is by 
treating it as a specific kind of discourse that the manifest privileges 
enjoyed by communal narrators become fully visible. As argued the 
primary among these is the privilege of sovereignty akin to the one 
enjoyed by the narrating ‘I’ in the literary genre of autobiography. 
Whereas the discourses of historiography entail a subject-position for the 
critic and a set of rules for legitimate critique, the autobiographical ‘we’ 
in collective memory is sovereign and unchallengeable as it recollects 
past events in ways validated primarily by the moral and emotional 
needs and preferences of the community itself. 
 If these privileges are what secures the narrator a superior and 
to a large extent immune position for articulating the communal past, 
then myth is to be understood as the political instrumentalisation of 
these privileges; as the narrative framework through they are put to 
work in the legitimation of concrete political choices and aims. Even 
if fundamentally a narrative about the foundation of community, the 
original values identified by myth in the emergence of the community 
are transferred to the present and installed as the moral codes of present 
communal life. The political choices of the present find in myth a 
grander frame and therefore a deeper legitimacy than that established 
by the immediate gains and advantages of particular policies, because 
myth ties them into narrative trajectory toward a utopian future. 
 To understand how the construction of community trades on 
articulations of a common past, it is therefore crucial to appreciate both 
the status of the subject-position in a discourse of collective memory, 
and the utopian trajectory of mythical narratives, because one in essence 
is the foundation for a political potential, realised – in various specific 





1 The concept of political myths has long been present in the social sciences, 
but, as Chiara Bottici and Benoît Challand, point out there is, despite an 
ever-growing literature, no consolidated theoretical framework on political 
myth (Bottici & Challard 2006:316).
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